Sonic Identification and Listening Strategies Towards a ‘Natural’ Narratology for Electroacoustic Musics

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Abstract

The aim of this presentation is to integrate two narratological notions in the analysis of electroacoustic musics, not as metaphors, but as accurate ways of describing the listener’s apprehension of an acousmatic work. Those notions are “diegesis” and “focalization”. They follow the definition of narrativity given by Monika Fludernik in *Towards a ‘natural’ narratology*: “narrativity is therefore a function of narrative texts and centers on experientiality of an anthropomorphic nature”. It isn’t necessary that things happen, or that a story be told. Experientiality in itself builds narrativity. I use the term “agentization” as the perceptual process of defining an anthropomorphic being who experiences.

Studying diverse models for music reception (Kaltenecker, Schaeffer, Delalande, etc.) and space apprehension, I put forward three mains domains, linked to three ways of centering experientiality (“focalizations”): ego-centered, hetero-centered and extero-centered. By cross-referencing those with cognitive models, I distinguish between embodied, ecological and semiotic narrativization processes.

I then focus on ecological narrativization processes with the study of “diegetization” as the construction of a diegesis, a narrative world. The question of referentiality is linked to several typological models and arguments, always putting an emphasis on voice as a special case. Drawing a parallel with Kilpatrick’s adaptation of Bakhtin’s “chronotopes” for music, I propose to set apart a referential/contextual diegesis and an abstract/independent one.

Introduction

This paper follows and furthers the theory I introduced in “Vers une narratologie ‘naturelle’ de la musique” (Marty 2011), developed in the course of my master’s thesis at the university of Paris-Sorbonne (Marty 2012). Reading the title might annoy some readers, as both ‘natural’ and ‘narratology’ are concepts that do not have very happy precedents in the field of musicology. I will have to explain why and how I use those concepts, before I can proceed to further levels.

* The PowerPoint presentation with audio can be found at http://marty.nicolas.chez.com/ems12.html. The audio samples may be downloaded at https://www.dropbox.com/s/9zhphp07m1ghfc4/samples.rar or you may contact me via email.
A ‘Natural’ Narratology

The ideas of ‘narrativity’ and ‘narratology’ have a strong attachment to literature, as they were conceived to serve literary analysis of story-telling and plot-driven narratives. A translation for musicological analysis thus seems to have to be justified in regard to literary models, of definitions of narrativity that pre-exists. But does it have to be subordinated to those models?

The two main musicological works that concern narrativity in music keep the attachment: Nattiez (1990) considers that music can only imitate the “contours” of a narrative, since, even if it seems to be able to describe actions, it cannot tell us about the ‘why’ of those actions; Grabócz (2009) and Tarasti (2004) work out of the structuralist model of narrative, which, even if it applies quite well to the analysis of sonatas, is at a complete loss when it comes to contemporary works, athematic and/or free forms, and does not allow them to formulate a clear thought about whether their analyses are about a narrativity intrinsic to a work or about a potential for the construction of a narrative1 by the listener (Nattiez 2011).

Bill Brunson (2012), whose presentation was much more complete than mine concerning existing models, proposed that we consider narrativity in music as a sibling to narrativity in literature, rather as a subordinate. I agree with this way of thinking, and follow Fludernik (2002) in saying that “narrativity is… centered on experientiality of an anthropomorphic nature”. Thus, there need only be an anthropomorphic being who experiences for a listener to construct narrativity via narrativization. I will later call “focalization” the centration of the experientiality.

The ‘natural’ is an even harder concept to use, since it has got innatist connotations, which could make people think that I want to talk about narrativity as ‘universal’, ‘innate’ or ‘uncultural’. This is absolutely not what I mean. The idea of anything being ‘universal’ is very ethnocentric and anthropocentric, and should stay a philosophical question2. As for ‘innatism’, it is very far from my current concerns. I will borrow once more the concept of ‘natural’ from Fludernik (2002), who defines it as based upon cognitive embodiedness, narrativity being studied from the point of view of the receptor. Thus, the ‘natural’ encompasses the cultural.

It might be seen as hypocritical to refute the current literature-related studies of narrativity in music, and to take another literary model as a basis. But it must be considered that Fludernik’s model is developed from an abstract point of view (even if she then only applies it to the reception of verbal contents) and considers the reception, which allows for a translation better than has the structuralist model, for instance.

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1 The reader might note that I didn’t say “a narrative construction”, but “the construction of a narrative”, as I wish to make (after Ryan, 2004) a distinction between ‘narrative’ as a noun and ‘narrative’ as an adjective, the first referring to the literary narrative (of which the definition, whilst still large, is firmly attached to plot-driven story and events), the second referring to the quality of narrativity that may take on a wider meaning and allow for a detachment from literature.

2 Evidently, some things are general to the human species, but I don’t think this allows us to call them “universals”.

Nicolas Marty

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Listening Strategies

Now that all misunderstanding is gone concerning my use of terminology, I can begin to get
to the core of this paper by presenting the research already done about listening strategies.

Kaltenecker (2010: 223-6) discovered four ways of listening in the XVIII\textsuperscript{th} century occidental
world. Those are ineffable, sublime, imaginative and reflexive listenings.

Schaeffer (1998: 154), as developing musique concrète, distinguished between two main
intentions for listening, according to whether the listener was going for the indices and
meaning of the sound, or for the sound object abstracted via reduced listening.

Baboni-Schilingi (interviewed in Marty 2012), a contemporary composer of mainly mixed
music, proposed four hermeneutic models for the reception of music: embodied, natural,
mechanical and anthropological (the latter being the cultural reassessment of the three
others).

Delalande (1998) led an experiment with experts in electroacoustic music at the GRM,
finding out three of what he called “listening behaviors”, of which he thought that they were
mutually exclusive: empathic, figurative and taxonomic.

Anderson (2007) took further the work of Delalande by realizing an experiment with both
experts and non-experts, in a written (and/or pictorial), individual form. She concluded that
the listening behaviors were wider than Delalande previously thought, and that they were not
incompatible with one another. This led her to rename the behaviors as Self-Orientation,
Imaginary Realms, Structural Attributes and, as a fourth orientation for listening, she found
Sound Properties, not as the phenomenological construction of the sound-object proposed by
Schaeffer, but as direct perception of the sound qualities before segmentation.

The colors I used to characterize each listening strategy allow us to see more clearly four
main orientations for listening. We first have, with an empathic, ineffable, self-oriented
listening, BODY AND EMOTIONS. The imagination, figuration, and interpretation of sound
as meaning or indicating something characterize a listening oriented towards
IDENTIFICATION AND IMAGINATION. The reflexive, analytic and structural listenings
are generalized in ANALYSIS AND CONCEPTS. Lastly, SOUND itself is of some
importance, even if it does not seem to be considered on its own very often. I will develop my
concept of ‘focalization’ upon those four orientations.

Focalization as the centration of experientiality

‘Focalization’, in the narratological vocabulary of Genette (1972), is a substitution for the
concept of the ‘point of view’. I would like to extend this idea into focalization as a point of
experientiality: if, in the domain of literature, focalization might represent the relation
between the reader, the narrator and his narration, being a basis for the interpretation of the
narrative, in the domain of (electroacoustic) music – and considering a ‘natural’ narratology –
focalization might be the point of centration of the experientiality that is necessary for
narrativity to exist. I will consider four main focalizations, related to the four orientations for
listening.

Meunier (2009) distinguishes three types of cognitive representations which can be either
transitory (when they are activated in working memory) or permanent (when they are
encoded in long-term memory). Those are *action-related representations* (constituted by *savoir-faire* and knowledge about action), *pictorial representations* (analogous copies of the real, visual space, that are treated as if they were real – the cognitive representation of a map being explored similarly to the map itself) and *propositional / conceptual representations* (that correspond to the nearly verbal constitution of predicative structures, concepts, schemas and scripts).

As listeners orient themselves towards **BODY AND EMOTIONS**, they activate the procedural component of action-related cognitive representations. That is, you can slap somebody before you even think about explaining how you may slap somebody (and your explanation, being abstracted by verbalization, would never be as complete and specific as the slap itself). This is thus related to embodied cognition and subjective time experience, the latter having been studied by Imberty (2005) through the idea of the ‘proto-narrative envelope’ borrowed from Stern (1995). When considering his own experiencing of the music in its temporality, the listener *is the experiencer* necessary for narrativity to exist. I call this an *egocentered* (or *self-centered*) focalization. This corresponds to what I qualify as *embodied narrativization processes*. Processes of abstraction may lead from here to the interpretation of the experience as *meaning* something or pointing towards a more general phenomenon, as studied by Baboni-Schilingi (2008) with his six models for the embodied interpretation of music.

As listeners orient themselves towards **IDENTIFICATION AND IMAGINATION** (that is, indices, figurations, etc.), they activate pictorial cognitive representations, which are visual, analogous copies of the real, and conserve spatial relations. This last thing is an extremely important point in the case of electroacoustic music, since acousmatic spatial relations will be related by the listener to pictorial representations, in order, for instance, to construct a diegesis (I will come to that in this paper). The question of space and the construction of auditory images has already been studied quite extensively (Bregman 2004, McAdams 1984, etc.) and even in the course of this conference I was happy to see that some of the points I wanted to emphasize were also studied by others (Khosravi 2012, Loch 2012). I call this orientation towards a spatiotemporal world a *heterocentered focalization*, for experientiality is lent to another being, whether it is physically real (i.e. the composer or performer) or imagined from an acousmatic situation (via *ecological narrativization processes*). Processes of abstraction may lead from here to the consideration of semantic, synesthetic or metaphorical values.

As listeners orient themselves towards **ANALYSIS AND CONCEPTS**, they activate propositional / conceptual cognitive representations, which are very closely related to language, and treated at an already abstract(ed) level. This will correspond, for instance, to formal analysis, to reduced listening in order to hear through the lens of Schaeffer’s typo-morphology (Schaeffer 1998: 584-7) or to conceptual interpretation (Kim-Cohen 2009). Here there is no experiencer, so we might say that there is no narrativity. And yet, one can imagine (more easily in the case of tonal music, or of some electroacoustic works where systematic relations are perceivable) that focalization may be put on the musical system itself, as a point of reference parallel to which the actual phenomena occur. I call this an *exterocentered* focalization.

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3 The consideration of the composer or performer as the experiencing subject is the core of what I call an *external diegesis*, about which I won’t be able to talk here, because it would ask for an extensive study which may be the topic of a future presentation.
**focalization**, as focalization is put on something “extra-human”. It implies **semiotic narrativization processes**.

In humans, the point of reference is one’s own body, as – at least in today’s occidental world – we develop a sense of self by, amongst other things, separating ourselves from the external world with which we can only interact within a limited spatial range (Fontaine 2007). As listeners orient themselves towards **SOUND** itself, without consideration for its spatial position, its effects on them or its syntactical and conceptual values, they find themselves in a state of **tactile** reception, specific to what I call **afocalization**. The purest form of this might well be the Buddhist’s “nirvāṇa”, where things stop to exist in space and time to just be. There is then no cognition, no interpretation, and no “striation” of the space via an arbitrary choice of a point of reference. This is a purely “smooth space”, an aformal space that “contains no forms nor subjects, but populates itself with forces and fluxes, thus constituting a fluid, moving space, with no anchoring or polarization, no imprint that is not ephemeral” (Buydens 2003). There would then be no narrativity at all, not even the “proto-narrativity” of the encoding of time experience. But this state might sound quite esoteric to occidental ears.

As Anderson (2007) said, and as I want to emphasize, listening (and, in the scope of this paper, narrativization via focalization) is always a multidimensional and dynamic (diachronic) process, so the orientations I put forward here are but potential components of a listening process proper to each individual, and characterized by many subordinate processes. The immersion of oneself as experiencer in an imaginary world concretized from an acousmatic work – Loch (2012) called this the “inhabitant” listening – would, for instance, be a good meeting point between egocentered and heterocentered focalizations, since the listener would experience the point of view of him- or herself, but an imaginary self, a self as it would be if immersed in an imaginary world.

**Sonic Identification**

I will now focus on heterocentered focalization as being an inductor for **diegetic construction**. This kind of focalization is related both to identification and imagination. I will begin with the question of identification.

Pousseur (1972: 8-9) distinguished, according to their degree of intentionality, between “three or rather four types of sonorities:

– those that are produced by an explicitly sonorous intention: vocal utterances, or sounds engendered by the voluntary induction of vibration of an appropriate sounding body;
– those that are not wanted as such, but still happen as the result of an intentional, directed, aimed action: walking, for instance, or the sound of a door that is closed, or that of industrial machines;
– those that result of some ‘purely mechanical’ event, fall, etc., that mainly demonstrate an effect of inertia, and yet manifest the ‘functional’ structure of an item (for instance that of a chair that is knocked over or of a door that is slammed by a draft) and the existence of some oriented physical phenomena as gravity, etc. (this third point could be encompassed by the two that surrounds it);
– lastly, those that are not caused by anything but chance, at least at a certain scale: purely statistical moves, with a disorderly gathering of many moves that are blind to one another, bereft of aimed and merging structural coordination: sounds of the rain, of the sea, of
waterfalls or of the wind in the leaves, noises of a crowd at a certain density level and heard at a certain distance, etc., gathering phenomena upon which inertia holds a particularly unsparing power.”

I reinterpreted this classification for it to be better suited to the study of identification. I distinguish, from the least to the most intentional, between:

– EVENTS, which seem to be “self-produced” as their morphologies do not imply the action of an external agent. Those correspond to the last of Pousseur’s categories, and comprise mainly continuing sounds of the nature and sounds produced artificially that reproduces the same characteristics: “delta” sounds, complex, polymorphological sounds that seem to be self-contained, like in the case of Smalley’s “contortion” (1986: 78), etc.;

– “MATERIALIZING SOUND INDICES” (see Chion 1990: 98-100), which are not the goal of the action that produces them, and thus encompass both the second and third categories of Pousseur’s classification, since all of those sounds are markers of an action and thus of a presence (whether that of a human, another animal or even the wind);

– INSTRUMENTAL SOUNDS, which correspond to sounds produced for the sake of sound, by the action of an agent on a physical item that is external to the agent himself (like the playing of a musical instrument);

– VOICE, which, as being intrinsic to the agent that produces it, is the most intentional and the most recognizable sound of all, even under extreme circumstance, as studied by Wishart with the concept of “utterance” (interviewed by Witts 1988: 454), and by Bergsland (2010) with his “maximal/minimal voiceness” model. Even Russolo (2009: 25-6) and Schaeffer (1998: 54) gave to voice particular considerations, whether it was classified as a separate category or briefly studied as the instrument for which the evolutions of morphological parameters were the most correlated to one another.

In the case of a heterocentered focalization in acousmatic listening, perceptive units (segmented according to Gestalt and other laws) will be identified as belonging to one category or the other, as being related to the real. The examples I use here are drawn from an experiment I led with a sample from Trevor Wishart’s Journey into Space (1972) for my master’s thesis (Marty 2012), and from listener’s comments and personal thoughts about a work of mine (Ethologie acousmatique : Paysages surréalistes, 2012)\(^4\).

I call the process of identifying a unit as an EVENT, EVENTIZATION. In sample 1 (from Paysages surréalistes), you can hear the sound of what can appear as bubbling water, as well as a nearly pitched, apparently synthetic, sound, both of which can be identified as being self-produced sound events. Those often form the “background” of perception.

I call the process of identifying a unit as a MATERIALIZING SOUND INDEX, MATERIALIZATION. In sample 2 (from Journey into Space), you can hear the sounds of steps, which can lead one to imagine those steps are produced by a human being. Then again, reduced listening might help composers forget this referentiality in order to consider the qualities of the sound object that can be abstracted from these steps.

\(^4\) An acousmography of the whole sample may be found at http://marty.nicolas.chez.com/Extrait_M2_Acous.swf, with authorization from Trevor Wishart.

\(^5\) The whole work may be listened to at https://soundcloud.com/nicolasmarty-1/paysages_surrealistes.
I call the process of identifying a unit as an “instrument”, to conceive it as being played by an agent via an action, INSTRUMENTALIZATION. In sample 3, the struck little bells may be listened to in that way, as if a person was actually playing them.

I call the process of identifying a unit as an “utterance”, a vocal production (implying its producer’s existence), HUMANIZATION. In the sample 4 (from Journey into Space), most people will hear a baby at first, before considering its purely sonic value. This is counterbalanced – though not always, as we will see – in the case of a singing voice, considering its more abstract (note-based) quality.

Lastly, I call the process of attributing a will (or other anthropomorphous qualities) to a perceptive unit, ANTHROPOMORPHIZATION. In sample 5, you may have identified the little ball as an anthropomorphous or zoomorphous being that chooses its own movements, for instance. This process is a step forward from an EVENTIZATION, since the unit is not only perceived as being autonomously produced: it also becomes a “living being”, and thus comes to foreground.

ANTHROPOMORPHIZATION, as well as HUMANIZATION (and MATERIALIZATION to a certain extent6), as they are all linked to the existence of an agent or subject, can be considered as specialized processes related to the idea of AGENTIZATION I put forward as the “creation/conception of the human subject [necessary to narrativity] by the reader or the listener as part of the process of narrativization” (Marty 2011). Agentization can be particularized with several potential “roles” for the agentized sound. Fludernik (2002: 245) says that

Readers’ visualizations of experientiality are necessarily linked to the existence of a human [or anthropomorphous] subject, the experiencer. That subject can realize experientiality as an agent, as a discursive or reflective instance (a teller or a ‘mind’ that cognizes), as an observer and as an experiencing consciousness.

I exemplified some of those possibilities in my paper about Ferrari’s Presque Rien series (Marty 2012x), with a point of view different from the one I use here, studying how the composer tried to induce processes of narrativization in the listener.

All of the processes I put forward in this part can take place on two mains fields of identification. This has been the concern of many electroacoustic composers and researchers, with what Schaeffer studied as the objet sonore, what Wishart (1986) called landscape (“the imagined world from which sounds come”), or what Bayle (1993) coined images-de-son, putting forward the fact that sounds, once recorded, are not sounds of something but images of sounds of something, which allow for more abstracted and/or metaphorical work on the composer’s side, though he should never forget the potential referentiality of sounds. When you hear sample 6, how do you categorize it?

Identification can be abstract: this is a hit, metallic sound. Those are things that are heard and grasped intuitively, metallic sounds undergoing different cerebral treatments than wooden or glass sounds during the first hundred milliseconds after perception (Aramaki and Besson 2010), before the sound is even encoded in working memory.

But identification can also be referential: it will then consider the source of a sound. People

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6 MATERIALIZATION and INSTRUMENTALIZATION would rather be encompassed in what I called OBJECTIZATION as considering a (non-autonomous) sound as produced by an agent (Marty 2011).
who had already heard a Tibetan bowl might have recognized the source in sample 6, with or without considering it fully for identification. People who hadn’t heard that before, but still identified the sound as being related to a physical item, might have identified it as a bell-shaped, metallic item, for instance.

We could also consider the metaphoric, synesthetic and signaletic implications of such a sound, which would be cultural and subjective, but would still exist for most (if not all) of us. This is, for instance, a sound of “relaxation”, a “high” sound, which could mean the call for the beginning of a prayer. But those are things related to processes that are more abstracting, extero-centered, out of the current topic and which require a full paper in themselves.

Diegetic constructions

I can now come to the part of heterocentered focalization that detaches itself from identification and relates more to imagination – diegetic construction. Once the perceptive units are identified (or rather if they are), they become existents that will help construct the diegesis in which they exist.

To Prince (2003: 28) regarding literary narrative, an existent is “an actor or an item of setting: the subject and object of ‘Susan looked at the table’ designate existents”, and diegesis is “the (fictional) world in which the situations and events narrated occur (in French, diégèse)” (ibid: 20). In our case, diegesis would rather be the (fictional) world in which existents evolve and relate to each other. DIEGETIZATION will be processed differently according to whether the identifications were referential, abstract or both.

In all cases, though, this process will be based on what Kilpatrick (2010) called “chronotopes”, using Bakhtin’s concept. Bakhtin (1981: 84) defined chronotopes as “the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature”. To Kilpatrick (2010: 58), this designates the spatiotemporal zones in which a literary narrative takes place… [In acousmatic music] a non-referential (sound object) chronotope would be a space/time in which non-referential sounds, such as those obtained through synthesis, heavy processing or reduced listening exist. They contain spatial and temporal information, but this is not drawn from external recording events taking place in a distinct space/time. Instead, they are likely to be the result of reverberation, echo, spatial placement and various sorts of metaphorical spatial impressions such as spectral or pitch space. The referential chronotope would be the space/time in which referential sounds were originally situated. A composition making use of a number of referential sounds recorded at a variety of times in a variety of locations may well have numerous layers of referential chronotopic information vying for supremacy within the chronotope of the work itself.

In the case of abstract identifications, the chronotopes are thus not referential, and can only relate identified sounds to one another and to the spaces and times they exist in. It is then the reduction of multiple potential spaces/times that constitutes the diegetization. This will be done by considering sounds as part of the same space-time. In my experiment (Marty 2012), a listener identified the low noise of sample 7 as being a “circular basis” on which “points” (the sounds of a baby and bells) evolved, with no more referentiality. This is what I call an

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7 The English language distinguishes between diegesis (telling) as opposed to mimesis (showing), and the diegesis as an equivalent to the French concept of diégèse, which is the one studied here. It is interesting (and maybe confusing) to note that the acousmatic diegesis is presented mainly by mimesis…
independent / abstract diegesis. Here the extreme importance of spatial positions and relations in electroacoustic music listening comes to foreground, as (at least abstract) diegetization seems to be greatly facilitated by those spatial characteristics, which may be compared with analogous copies of the real space we all have via pictorial cognitive representations.

In the case of referential identifications, the chronotopes are referential, as they are, to Kilpatrick (2010) the “space/time in which referential sounds were originally situated”. I’d like to go further and to consider this from a more esthetic, cognitive (‘natural’) point of view: since the listener may have no idea of the space-time in which sounds were originally situated, referential chronotopes are rather constituted by spaces and times in which the listener imagines sounds to be able to exist. This is close to Wishart’s idea of landscape (Wishart 1986) and to my conception of chronotopes as being the potential spatiotemporal identities of sounds (Marty 2012).

How does a listener construct such ideas? If chronotopes are potential identities, they may be considered from an objective point of view, and analyzed in their entirety. Would identification of the sound of a baby rather induce thoughts of night or day? Would identification of the sound of wind rather induce thoughts of exterior or interior spaces? A preliminary test, realized during my first year of master’s thesis, led me to conclude that the baby does not seem to have preferential temporal value, but that it seems to suggest preferentially an “inside” environment, as opposed to wind that orients listeners to the opposite spatial considerations. Cohabitation of the two then led listeners to either consider only one – often emphasizing the unusual situation (“the baby is alone outside”) – or to be dazzled by this coexistence (“there are several spaces at the same time… inside and outside”).

It thus seems that chronotopes, in my use of this concept, are related to the ecological frequency at which we can hear each sound in (or associated to, as in film sound) different spaces and times. It is then the cross-consideration of referential chronotopes that constitutes diegetization. Listeners, from a quasi-infinite number of possibilities, form a single referential diegesis that is unique to each of them. Referential sounds may then be related to one another, contextualized, as was the case with abstract diegetization. Only here, not only sounds are related to one another in terms of spatial position inside the diegesis, they may be related to one another in terms of function, that being allowed by referentiality.

In my experiment, the baby and the bells of sample 7, identified as such, were related to one another in two main ways: for some listeners, the baby played with the bells; for others, an adult was moving the bells above the baby. But more surprisingly, even singing voice was humanized when associated with the sounds of the pages of a book, leading to the idea of a person reading for several listeners. In sample 8, for the sounds of pages to be as recognizable as they were for the listeners, the reader might want to use quality headphones as this was the case in the experiment.

As Kilpatrick (2010) saw, and as I was able to conclude too from my experiment, it seems that referential chronotopes have a greater “gravitational pull” than abstract ones, and that once a listener identifies a sound referentially in space-time, it is difficult for him/her to consider any other sound as abstract, most of the sounds being integrated into the referential diegesis. And yet, this is not always the case. Here, the concept of diegesis comes in handy in its relation to cinematography. At times, whereas the sound of baby and the low noise of sample 6 were identified as a baby and wind, the sounds of little bells seemed to be considered as extra-diegetic, as being a musical accompaniment for the foreground referential
events. This would need some experimenting, but I tend to think that note-based content integrated within a referential diegesis might have this tendency to stay out of the diegesis and resist the referential pull more easily than would sound-based content like the low noise.

Conclusion

During the course of this paper, I have presented a part of my theory concerning the consideration of narrativity in the reception of acousmatic/electroacoustic music by listeners. I began by proposing a four-way model for listening strategies (or behaviors, according to the degree of control of the listener over them), that allowed for the introduction of the concept of ‘focalization’, designating the centration of the experientiality on an experiencer, whether it is the listener him/herself (EGO/SELF-CENTERED FOCALIZATION), another (real or imagined, human or anthropomorphous) being (HETEROCENTERED FOCALIZATION), a (musical) system as a point a reference (EXTEROCENTERED FOCALIZATION) or an absence of focalization (AFOCALIZATION) considering the sound itself in its tactile properties.

In the context of heterocentered focalization, I then introduced the idea of the DIEGESIS constructed via DIEGETIZATION, from the gathering of chronotopic and functional interlinking of identified sound units (events, materializing sound indices, instruments, humans, or even anthropomorphized sounds). The importance of space and its treatment in electroacoustic music was put forward with the idea of pictorial cognitive representations.

If narratology has been considered as a metaphor in musicology until now, it is only because its use was largely ambiguous as it tried to apply literary types to music and used, in fact, metaphors analogous to the fe/male themes to do so. But the use of narratological concepts is not necessarily metaphoric when it comes to talking about listeners’ specific receptions of a work, about the individual level of reception, because reception itself implies the centration of experientiality, which can be considered as the sole necessary characteristic for narrativity to exist, plot and storytelling being based on experientiality.

References


